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ABSTRACT 
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) technology one of the most promising technologies in the field of ubiquitous computing. 
Indeed, RFID technology may well replace barcode technology. Although it offers many advantages over other identification 
systems, there are also associated security risks that are not easy to be addressed. When designing a real lightweight 
authentication protocol for low cost RFID tags, a number of challenges arise due to the extremely limited computational, storage 
and communication abilities of Low-cost RFID tags.  
      This paper proposes a real mutual authentication protocol for low cost RFID tags. The proposed protocol prevents passive 
attacks as active attacks are discounted when designing a protocol to meet the requirements of low cost RFID tags. However the 
implementation of the protocol meets the limited abilities of low cost RFID tags. 
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1 Introduction 
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) system is the latest technology that plays an important role for object 
identification as ubiquitous infrastructure. RFID has many applications in access control, manufacturing automation, 
maintenance, supply chain management, parking garage management, automatic payment, tracking, and inventory 
control. 
      EPCglobal is a member-driven organization composed of leading firms and industries that are focused on creating 
global standards for the EPCglobal Network.  EPCglobal is now leading the development of industry-driven standards 
for the Electronic Product Code (EPC) Network to support the use of Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) in 
today's fast-moving, information rich trading networks [13]. 
      An RFID system consists of three different components: RFID tag or transponder, Reader or interrogator, and 
backend server.  
RFID tag: is a tiny radio chip that comprises a simple silicon microchip attached to a small flat aerial and mounted on 
a substrate. The whole device can then be encapsulated in different materials (such as plastic) dependent upon its 
intended usage. The tag can be attached to an object, typically an item, box, or pallet, and read remotely to ascertain 
its identity, position, or state. For an active tag there will also be a battery. 
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Reader or Interrogator: sends and receives RF data to and from the tag via antennas. A reader may have multiple 
antennas that are responsible for sending and receiving radio waves. 
                 
   Figure 1. A variety of RFID Tags                        Figure 2. Examples of a Reader with Associated Electronics 
 
Host Computer (backend server): the data acquired by the readers is then passed to a host computer, which may run 
specialist RFID software or middleware to filter the data and route it to the correct application, to be processed into 
useful information. 
       RFID offer several advantages over barcodes: data are read automatically, line of sight not required, and through 
non-conducting materials at high rate and far distance. The reader can read the contents of the tags by broadcasting 
RF signals via antennas. The tags data acquired by the readers is then passed to a host computer, which may run 
middleware (API). Middleware offers processing modules or services to reduce load and network traffic within the 
back-end systems. RFID basic operations can be summarized as in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3. Basic Operations of RFID 
 
      RFID systems are vulnerable to a broad range of malicious attacks ranging from passive eavesdropping to active 
interference. Unlike in wired networks, where computing systems typically have both centralized and host-based 
defenses (e.g. firewalls), attacks against RFID networks can target decentralized parts of the system infrastructure, 
since RFID readers and RFID tags operate in an inherently unstable and potentially noisy environment. Additionally, 
RFID technology is evolving quickly – the tags are multiplying and shrinking - and so the threats they are susceptible 
to, are similarly evolving. Thus, it becomes increasingly difficult to have a global view of the problem [1]. 
      RFID tags may pose a considerable security and privacy risk to organizations and individuals using them. Since a 
typical tag answers its ID to any reader and the replied ID is always the same, an attacker can easily hack the system 
by reading out the data of a tag and duplicating it to bogus tags. Unprotected tags may have vulnerabilities to 
eavesdropping, location privacy, spoofing, or denial of service (DoS). Unauthorized readers may compromise privacy 
by accessing tags without adequate access control. Even when the content of the tags is protected, individuals may be 
tracked through predictable tag responses. Even though many cryptographic primitives can be used to remove these 
vulnerabilities, they cannot be applied to a RFID system due to the prohibitive cost of including protection for each 
and every RFID tag [3]. 
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Figure 4. Classification of RFID attacks 
Low-cost RFID tags in the form of Electronic Product Codes (EPC) are poised to become the most pervasive device 
in history. Already, there are billions of RFID tags on the market, used for applications like supply-chain 
management, inventory monitoring, access control, and payment systems. When designing a real lightweight 
authentication protocol for low cost RFID tags, a number of challenges arise due to the extremely limited 
computational, storage and communication abilities of low-cost RFID tags [4, 5, 7]. 
      This paper proposes a real mutual authentication protocol for low cost RFID tags. The proposed protocol prevents 
passive attacks as active attacks are discounted when designing a protocol to meet the requirements of low cost RFID 
tags. However the implementation of the protocol meets the limited abilities of low cost RFID tags. 
      This paper is organized in the following way: Section 2 presents the related work for mutual authentication 
protocols in low cost RFID tags. Section 3 presents the analysis of Gossamer protocol. Section 4 presents a Passive 
attack against Gossamer. Section 5 presents the proposed protocol. Section 6 presents the analysis of the proposed 
protocol. Section 7 concludes the paper. 
2 Related Work 
Over the past few years, researchers have developed many Ultralightweight Mutual Authentication Protocols (UMAP) 
that claim to prevent vulnerabilities associated with secure authentication of RFID tags and readers. In this section we 
consider a few recently proposed protocols and identify possible vulnerabilities in them. 
The security of UMAP has been analyzed in depth by the research community. Researches show how a passive 
attacker can disclose part of the secret information stored in the tag’s memory.  Active attacks are discounted when 
designing a protocol to meet the requirements of ultralightweight RFID tags. 
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In 2006, Peris et al. proposed a family of Ultralightweight Mutual Authentication Protocols (henceforth referred to as 
the UMAP family of protocols). Chronologically, M2AP [12] was the first proposal, followed by EMAP [10] and 
LMAP [11]. 
In 2007 Chien proposed a very interesting lightweight authentication protocol providing Strong Authentication and 
Strong Integrity (SASI) for low-cost RFID tags [4]. An index-pseudonym (IDS), the tag’s private identification (ID), 
and two keys (k1/k2) are stored both on the tag and in the back-end database. Simple bitwise XOR (⊕), bitwise AND 
(^), bitwise OR (v), addition 2m and left rotate Rot(x,y) are required on the tag. Additionally, random number 
generation is required on the reader. The protocol is divided into three states: tag identification, mutual authentication 
and updating phase. In the identification phase, the reader (R) sends a “hello” message to the tag (T), and the tag 
answers with its IDS. The reader then finds, in the back-end database, the information associated with the tag (ID and 
k1/k2), and the protocol continues to the mutual authentication phase. In this phase, the reader and the tag authenticate 
each other, and the index-pseudonym and keys are subsequently updated. 
 
Figure 5. SASI Protocol 
The protocol SASI was a step further towards a secure protocol compliant with real ultralightweight tag requirements. 
However cryptanalysis of SASI showed that passive attacker can obtain the secret ID by observing several 
consecutive authentications sessions [2].  
Cryptanalysis of SASI protocol: 
Assume the amount of rotation given by the second argument is zero modulo 96 we therefore have: 
K1’ = Rot (k1 ⊕ n2, k1) = Rot (k1 ⊕ n2, k1 mod 96) = Rot (k1 ⊕ n2, 0) = (k1 ⊕ n2). 
Similarly,  
k2’ = Rot (K2 ⊕ n1, K2) = (K2 ⊕ n1). 
So IDSnext = (IDS + ID) ⊕ (n2 ⊕ k1’) = (IDS + ID) ⊕ (n2 ⊕ k1 ⊕ n2) = (IDS + ID) ⊕ k1 
So ID = (IDSnext  ⊕ k1−IDS)  
and we can take full advantage of the knowledge that k1 = k2 = 0 mod 96 to conclude that:- 
ID mod 96 ≈ (IDSnext − IDS) mod 96.                     (1) 
AS C = (k1 ⊕ k2’) + (k2 ⊕ k1’) = (k1 ⊕ K2 ⊕ n1) + (K2 ⊕ k1 ⊕ n2)  
This implies that  
C mod 96 = (k1 ⊕ K2 ⊕ n1) + (K2 ⊕ k1 ⊕ n2) mod 96 ≈ (n1 + n2) mod 96. 
The value of n1 +n2 mod 96 can also be obtained from the observed values of public messages A, B and IDS because 
 A = (IDS ⊕ k1 ⊕ n1)                 n1  (A ⊕ IDS ⊕ k1) 
And then we can get that  
n1 mod 96 = (A⊕IDS⊕ k1) mod 96 ≈ (A ⊕ IDS) mod 96  
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Similarly, n2 ≈ (B − IDS) mod 96  
So C mod 96 ≈ (n1 + n2) mod 96  
     C mod 96 ≈ (A ⊕ IDS) + (B − IDS) mod 96                  (2) 
Then snoop on multiple authentication sessions and, for each one, verify if previous condition holds. If this is the 
case, compute the value (IDSnext − IDS) mod 96 and, from this, directly approximate ID mod 96 (1). 
Hence Gossamer protocol which is inspired by SASI scheme but hopefully avoiding its weaknesses was proposed.  
The protocol comprises three stages: tag identification phase, mutual authentication phase, and updating phase 
Figure.6.  
 
 
Figure 6. Gossamer Protocol 
 
       In Tag Identification the reader first sends a “hello” message to the tag, which answers with its potential next 
IDS. The reader then tries to match each entry in the database. If this search succeeds, the mutual authentication phase 
starts. Otherwise the identification is retried but with the old IDS, which is backscattered by the tag upon request. 
Mutual Authentication with IDS, the reader acquires the private information linked to the tag, identified from the 
database. Then the reader generates nonces n1 and n2 and builds and sends to the tag A||B||C. From submessages A 
and B, the tag extracts nonces n1 and n2. Then it computes n3/n’1 and k*1/k*2 and builds a local version of 
submessage C’. This is compared with the received value. If it is verified, the reader is authenticated. Finally, the tag 
sends message D to the reader. On receiving D, this value is compared with a computed local version. If comparison 
is successful, the tag is authenticated; otherwise the protocol is abandoned. Index-Pseudonym and Key Updating After 
successfully completing the mutual authentication phase between reader and tag, they locally update IDS and keys 
(k1/k2). Submessages C/D allow reader/tag authentication, respectively. Moreover, the use of submessages C/D 
results in confirmation of synchronization for the internal secret values (n3/n’1 and k*1/k*2) used in the updating 
phase,preventing straightforward desynchronization attacks. For the implementation of the proposed protocol, only 
simple operations are available on tags, in accordance with their restrictions: specifically, bitwise XOR (v), addition 
mod 2m (+), and Rot(x, y). To avoid ambiguity, Rot(x, y) is defined to perform a circular shift on the value of x, (y 
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mod N) positions to the left for a given value of N (in our case 96). Random number generation, required in the 
protocol to supply freshness, is a costly operation, so it is performed by the reader. To significantly increase security, 
a non linear lightweight function calledMixBits is added: 
Z = MixBits(X, Y) 
{Z = X; 
for (i=0; i<32; i++) { 
Z = (Z>>1) + Z + Z + Y ;}} 
 
3      Analysis of Gossamer protocol   
This section presents the performance and security analysis of Gossmer protocol as presented in authors’ papers [2]. 
   
3.1    Performance Analysis  
       Computational cost:  Gossamer only requires simple bitwise XOR, addition 2m, left rotation, and the MixBits 
function on tags. These operations are very low-cost and can be efficiently implemented in hardware. MixBits is very 
efficient from a hardware perspective. The number of iterations of this function is optimized to guarantee a good 
diffusion effect.  
       Storage requirement: Each tag stores its static identifier (ID) and two records of the tuple (IDS, k1, K2) with old 
and potential new values. A 96-bit length is assumed for all elements in accordance with EPCGlobal. The ID is a 
static value, thus stored in ROM. The remaining values (96 × 6 = 576 bits) are stored in a rewritable memory because 
they need to be updated. 
      Communication cost: Gossamer performs mutual authentication and integrity protection with only four 
messages. In the identification phase, a “hello” and IDS message are sent over the channel. Messages A||B||C and D 
are transmitted in the authentication phase. So a total of 424 bits are sent over the channel - considering 5 bytes for the 
“hello”message.                                        
3.2    Security Analysis  
Data Confidentiality All public messages are composed of at least three secret values shared only by legitimate 
readers and genuine tags. The static identifier and the secret keys cannot, be easily obtained by an eavesdropper. 
        Tag anonymity Each tag updates IDS and private keys (k1, K2) after successful authentication, and this update 
process involves random numbers (n3, n’1, n’2). When the tag is interrogated again, a fresh IDS is backscattered. 
Additionally, all public submessages (A||B||C|| and D) are anonymized by the use of random numbers (n1, n2, n3, 
n’1). Tag anonymity is thus guaranteed, and location privacy of the tag owner is not compromised.  
       Mutual Authentication and Data Integrity The protocol provides mutual authentication. Only a legitimate 
reader possessing keys (k1, K2), can build a valid message A||B||C. Similarly, only a genuine tag can derive nonces 
n1, n2 from A||B||C, and then compute message D. Messages C and D, which involve the internal secret values (n3, 
n’1, k1*, k2*) and nonces (n1, n2), allow data integrity to be checked.  
       Replay attacks An eavesdropper could store all the messages exchanged in a protocol run. To impersonate the 
tag, he could replay message D. However, this response would be invalid as different nonces are employed in each 
session -this will frustrate this naive attack. Additionally, the attacker could pretend that the reader has not 
accomplished the updating phase in the previous session. In this scenario, the tag is identified by the old index-
pseudonym and the attacker may forward the eavesdropped values of A||B||C. Even if this is successful, no secret 
information is disclosed and the internal state is unchanged in the genuine tag, so all these attacks are unsuccessful.  
       Forward Security Imagine that a tag is exposed one day, making public its secret information (ID, k1, K2). The 
attacker still cannot infer any information from previous sessions as two unknown nonces (n1, n2) and five internal 
secret values (n3, n’1, n’2, k1*, K2*) are involved in the message creation (mutual authentication phase). 
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Additionally, these internal values are employed in the updating phase. Consequently, past communications cannot be 
easily jeopardized.  
       Updating Confirmation The Gossamer protocol assumes that tags and readers share certain secret values. As 
these values are locally updated, synchronization is mandatory. Submessages C and D provide confirmation of the 
internal secret values (n3, n’1, k*1, k*2) and nonces (n1, n2). These values are employed in the updating stage. So the 
correct update of values IDS and keys (k1, k2) is implicitly ensured by submessages C and D. Unintentional 
transmission errors can happen in the received messages since a radio link is used. This is an extremely serious issue 
for message D, since it can result in a loss of synchronization. However, the tuple (IDS, k1, K2) is stored twice in the 
tag memory -once with the old values, the other with the potential next values. With this mechanism, even in the 
event that message D is incorrectly received, the tag and the reader can still authenticate with the old values. So the 
reader and the tag will be able to recover their synchronized state [2]. 
4      Passive Attacks against Gossamer 
 
Attack 1: For this attack to work, the following condition has to be satisfied: Two nonces n1, n2 mod 96 = 0. 
 
If n1, n2 mod 96 = 0 
Then 
MixBits(0 mod 96,0 mod 96)=0 mod 96                                (3) 
C = ROT ((ROT (n3+ K1*+pi+n1', n3)+K2*⊕n1', n2) ⊕n1‘  
From (3) 
n1, n2, n3, n1’ mod 96 all become ZEROs  
Hence 
C = K1* + pi + K2* 
K1*+K2*=C-pi                                                                       (4) 
Similarly  
D = ROT((ROT(n2+K2*+ ID+n1', n2) +K1* +n1', n3) +n1'  
   = K1*+ID+K2* 
K1* + K2* = D - ID                                       (5) 
IDSnext =ROT ((ROT (n1'+K1*+IDS+n2',n1')+K2* ⊕n2', n3) ⊕n2'  
           = K1* + IDS + K2*  
 K1* + K2* = IDSnext  -  IDS                      (6) 
From (2) and (3) ID = D – C + pi       (7) 
From (3) and (4) ID = D - IDSnext + IDS                (8) 
From (2) and (4) C-pi = IDSnext - IDS                                   (9) 
 
While observing the external exchanged public messages, if two successive authentication sessions satisfy equation 
(9), then ID value is determined. 
Hence a passive attacker can find out the values of the secrete ID value.  
 
Attack 2: If k1, K2 = 0 mod 96 Then: 
A = ROT ((ROT (IDS+K1+pi+n1, K2) +K1, K1)   
    = IDS + pi+n1  
Then n1 = A - IDS – pi                                                     n1 is known 
Similarly B = ROT ((ROT (IDS+K2+pi+n2, K1) +K2, K2)   
                   = IDS + pi+n1  
Then n2 = B - IDS – pi                                                                    n2 is known  
n3 = MixBits (n1, n2), n1’ = MixBits(n3,n2)                           n1’,n3 are known 
 K1* = ROT ((ROT (n2+K1+pi+n3, n2) +K2⊕n3, n1) ⊕n3 
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         =ROT((ROT(n2+pi+n3,n2)⊕n3,n1)⊕n3                             K1* is known 
Similarly  
K2* = ROT ((ROT (n1+K2+pi+n3, n1) +K1+n3, n2) +n3  
        =ROT((ROT(n1+pi+n3, n1) +n3 n2)+n3                              K2* is known 
C=ROT ((ROT (n3+K1*+pi+n1', n3) +K2*⊕n1', n2) ⊕n1‘ 
=ROT((ROT(n3+K1*+pi+n1',n3)+K2*⊕n1',n2)⊕n1‘                C is known (10)  
D=ROT ((ROT (n2+K2* + ID+n1', n2) +K1*+n1', n3) +n1‘ 
So  ID=ROTright(ROTright((D-n1‘),n3)-K1*-n1‘,n2)-n2-K2*-n1’                      (11) 
While observing the external exchanged public messages, if transmitted C = calculated C from (10), then ID value can 
be determined from (11). 
And all secret values (k1, k2, n1, n2, n3, n1’, n2’, ID) will be known so IDSnext can be determined also: 
n2‘= MIXBITS (n1 ', n3)                                n2’ is known 
IDSnext=ROT((ROT(n1'+K1*+IDS+n2',n1')+K2*⊕n2',n3)⊕n2‘ 
Hence this attack can be done in one session. 
Note: The second attack is computationally infeasible since n1 is determined out of  289 permutations. 
 
5      Proposed Solution 
 
      The paper proposes two modifications added to Gossamer protocol for making the protocol more secured against 
passive attacks: 
- Make rotation functions dependent of nonces and keys values as shown in Figure.7 and Figure.8. 
- MixBits function in Gossamer guarantees that in case both of its two inputs are zeros mod 96, its output will 
be zero mod 96. Hence modifying MixBits function as shown in Figure.9 to guarantee that in case of its two 
inputs is zeros mod 96; its output will not be zero mod 96 will increase the security of the protocol. 
However the modifications of the proposed protocol do not affect computational, storage, or communication cost 
of Gossamer. It can be realistically implemented, even in low cost RFID tags. 
 
 
 
 
Figure.7 Modified Gossamer at Reader 
International Journal of Network Security & Its Applications (IJNSA), Volume 2, Number 2, April 2010 
 
35 
 
 
 
Figure.8 Modified Gossamer at tag 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure.9 Modified MixBits 
 
 
6      Analysis of the Proposed Solution 
 
Analyzing the security and performance of the proposed protocol shows that the added modifications increase security 
level of Gossamer and prevent eavesdropping on public messages between reader and tag.   
Considering the former first attack scenario, ID cannot be determined as follows: 
If n1, n2 mod 96 =0 
Then  
A = ROT (IDS+K1+pi, K2) +K1 
B = ROT (IDS+K2+pi, K1) +K2 
K1* = ROT (K1+pi+n3+ K2⊕n3, k1) ⊕n3   
K2* = ROT (K2+pi+K1+2n3, K2) +n3 
C = ROT ((ROT (n3+K1*+pi+n1', n3) +K2*⊕n1', K2*) ⊕n1‘ 
D = ROT ((ROT (n2+K2*+ID+n1', n2) +K1*+n1', k1*) +n1' 
    = ROT (K2*+ID+n1’+K1*+n1', k1*) +n1'. 
Then from these set of equations ID cannot be determined. 
 
Considering the former second attack scenario, ID cannot be determined as follows: 
If k1, k2 mod 96 =0 
 A = ROT ((ROT (IDS+K1+pi+n1, K2) +K1, n2)  
 B = ROT ((ROT (IDS+K2+pi+n2, K1) +K2, n1)  
Then:- 
A = ROT (IDS+pi+n1, n2)  
B = ROT (IDS+pi+n2, n1)                                 
K1*=ROT (n2+pi+n3, n2) 
K2*=ROT (n1+pi+n3, n1) +n3+n3 
C=ROT ((ROT (n3+K1*+pi+n1', n3) +K2*⊕n1', K2*) ⊕n1 
D=ROT ((ROT (n2+K2*+ID+n1', n2) +K1*+n1', k1*) +n1’. 
   =ROT (K2*+ID+n1'+K1*+n1', k1*) +n1’. 
Then from these set of equations ID cannot determined. 
Z = MixBits(X, Y) 
{    Z = X; 
      for (i=0; i< 32; i++)  
      {Z = (Z+i) + Z + Z + Y ;} 
} 
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Even if we assume that k1, K2, n1, n2 mod 96 =0 at the same time, ID cannot be determined as follows: 
A = IDS + pi 
B = IDS + pi 
As n3 = MixBits(n1,n2)    n3 ≠  0 mod 96    
K1* = pi + n3  
K2* = pi + 3n3 
C = ROT ((ROT (n3+K1*+pi+n1', n3) +K2*⊕n1', K2*) ⊕n1‘      
D = ROT ((ROT (n2+K2*+ID+n1', n2) +K1*+n1', k1*) +n1'        
ROT (K2*+ID+n1‘+ K1*+n1', k1*) +n1'.  
Then from these set of equations ID cannot determined. 
 
7     Conclusion 
 
This paper has proposed modifications to Gossamer mutual authentication protocol for low cost RFID tags. The proposed 
protocol prevents passive attacks as active attacks are discounted when designing a protocol to meet the requirements of low cost 
RFID tags. The analysis of the proposed protocol shows that the added modifications increase security level of Gossamer and 
prevent eavesdropping on public messages between reader and tag. However the modifications of the proposed protocol do not 
affect computational, storage, or communication cost of Gossamer. It can be realistically implemented, even in low cost RFID 
tags. 
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